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NPE | Introduction 
A botched lethal injection in Oklahoma in April this year has escalated the issue of US capital 
punishment back into the international spotlight, raising new questions about the drugs being 
used and the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment1. Due to a 
shortage of lethal injection drugs, the state has used for the first time a new three-drug cocktail 
for an execution which has led to a massive failure: prisoner Clayton Lockett was dead after 43 
minutes due to a massive heart attack. In 2010 the European Commission added eight 
barbiturates to its list of restricted products that are tightly controlled on the grounds that they 
may be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. These restrictions include pentobarbital and sodium thiopental: the two drugs on 
which almost all American executions currently depend. The EC said its move was designed to 
forward the EU’s stated mission to abolish the death penalty around the world.  By refusing to 
export lethal injection drugs to the US the European Union had found a way to export its 
rejection of capital punishment. While the US is still executing and the European boycott has 
not slowed down executions in states like Texas, this level of public attention to capital 
punishment since April has not been seen in decades.  
The recent Oklahoma incident and the attitude of the EU reminds us of Ian Manners’ article 
‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms’. In this article Manners considered the 
influence of the EU on the abolition of the death penalty. According to his article the EU has 
considerable impact in bringing about abolition of the death penalty in different countries. The 
main argument of Manners is that the European Union has the power to shape and determine 
international norms with norms defined as collective expectations about proper behavior for a 
given identity (Jepperson, 2006). Analysing the foreign policy and external relations of the 
European Union through Normative Power Europe has been accepted in both policy debates 
and academic studies. NPE creates a useful and significant concept that has provoked 
substantial debate and research among scholars (Diez, 2005: Pace, 2007: Bickerton, 2007: 
Whitman, 2009). The power configuration of the EU has been an interesting topic among the 
                                                     
1
   Clayton Lockett writhed and groaned. After 43 minutes, he was declared dead 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/30/clayton-lockett-oklahoma-execution-witness 
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scholars. Concepts such as civilian power, soft power, small power, military power and 
normative power are frequently used by scholars in order to explain the power configuration of 
the EU. However, the majority of the literature on NPE however is based on the conceptual 
level while the empirical level still lacks attention. Given the geographical and thematic ample 
of EU foreign policy there is solid scope and need for additional empirical analysis. 
The encouragement of regional integration is one element of the European Union’s external 
action since the beginning of the European Union (Smith, 2008). Especially since the 1990s the 
European Union started vigorously to support for regional economic integration efforts among 
developing countries after being issued in the European Commission. According to the 
Commission, regional integration among developing countries, unless implemented in a 
transparent and open manner, encourages their integration in the world economy and plays a 
key role in conflict prevention and peace consolidation (European Commission, 1995). 
Furthermore, the European Parliament also shares this view of the Commission and points on 
the importance of regional integration and free trade agreements for the establishment of a 
more equitable world trade system (European Parliament, 2002). More recently, the EU seems 
to have stepped up its efforts to shape the regional integration process of developing countries, 
by undertaking comprehensive agreements with regional groupings, which cover not just trade, 
but also trade-related issues, development concerns and political aspects.  
Given the importance of regional integration of for the EU I will, with this research, analyse the 
intentional use of NPE at regional level, notably the actions of the EU towards regional 
integration in ASEAN. In order to analyse whether the EU is a normative power in prompting 
regional integration, this thesis will analyse the means, the impact and the intention of the EU 
towards Southeast Asian regional integration.  
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NPE | Literature review 
There is no harm in perceiving the European Union as one of the most successful institution 
when it comes to regional integration followed by not surprisingly the North American Free 
Trade and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Since the early 1950s the European 
Union has been a pioneer in regional integration. With the aim of achieving integration via 
trade with a view to economic expansion the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 by France, 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. In order to deepen the integration and expand the 
European Community’s powers to non-economic domains this treaty was followed by the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and as a result the European Union was established.  
Another example of the European integration process, developed in 2004, is the European 
Neighbourhood Policy which aims to share liberal values and core European foreign policy and 
security objectives with the neighbours’. With the ENP the European Union aims to share the 
befits of enlargements with the neighbouring countries as well as mutually handle the 
challenges resulting from the post-enlargement context (Kahraman, 2005). The ENP is 
considered a new policy in the sense that it aims at combining the traditional EU approaches of 
stabilization and integration towards neighbourhood. On the one hand, it is a policy for 
encouraging stability, security and prosperity beyond the borders of the EU by means of 
regional cooperation. On the other hand, it offers a privileged partnership for the neighbours, 
old and new, in exchange for their commitment to shared values. Seeing the neighbours as a 
ring of friends rather than third countries, the ENP seeks to enhance the strategic presence of 
the enlarged Union in wider Europe and beyond (Kahraman, 2005). 
In conjunction with the integration process described previously the European Union is 
simultaneously promoting regional integration not only within or near the European mainland 
but also in South America, Africa and Asia. The European Union and its African, Caribbean and 
Pacific partners have found that regional economic and political integration can bring political 
stability, prosperity and peace2. The European Union is helping the ACP partners with five 
challenges which include the strengthening of the capacities of regional institutions, supporting 
integrated regional markets, reinforcing the regional dimension of economic diversification, 
                                                     
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/trade/regional_integration_en.htm 
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increasing the stock in infrastructure and lastly supporting the regional policies on sustainable 
development.  
Comparable to the European Union the Association of South East Nations is also active in 
promoting regional integration. Akin to the EU the Association of South East Nations initially 
was established because of security reasons. In the beginning the formation of ASEAN was 
neither formed to integrate member economies nor to build a supranational institution (Guan, 
2004). Just like in the case of the European Union the ASEAN members originally aimed to 
preserve peace and security within the region through mainly focusing on constraining 
Indonesia because of its powerful military and the Indonesian – Malaysian confrontation during 
1963 - 1966 which were clear and important factors that could destabilize the region.  
However in the early years of ASEAN the integration process was exclusively limited to the 
security domain. Only after the end of the Cold-War and the removal of Sukarno in Indonesia, 
attempts to change ASEAN became more visible (Guan, 2004). The post-Cold War era is 
characterized by initiatives to increase economic integration in south East Asia. Some examples 
of these initiatives are the ASEAN Free Trade Area (1992), the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (1995), the Framework Agreement on Services and Intellectual Property (1995) and the 
ASEAN Investment Area Agreement (1998). The importance of factors such as balancing China’s 
competition for foreign investment, the fear of future exports being affected by the EU and 
NAFTA, the perceived convergence of regional economic relationships among member states 
and the necessity to keep regional liberalization one step ahead of WTO and APEC at all times 
made the member states decide to increase the integration deeper (Takeuchi, 1999).  
The fear that future exports could be affected by the European Union is one of the reasons that 
made the member states decide to deepen the integration, nowadays ASEAN as a whole 
represents the EU’s third largest trading partner outside Europe with more than € 206 billion of 
trade in goods and services in 2011. The European Union is ASEAN second largest trading 
partner after China, accounting for around eleven percent of ASEAN trade. In addition the EU is 
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by far the largest investor in ASEAN member states, European companies have invested around 
€ 9.1 billion annually on average (2000 – 2009)3.  
The European Union and ASEAN share a commitment to regional integration as a means of 
fostering regional stability, building prosperity and addressing global challenges. Besides trade 
negotiations with individual ASEAN members the European Union cooperates closely with the 
ASEAN region as a whole. Examples of this cooperation are the EU – ASEAN Dialogue which 
includes discussions on trade and investment issues at ministerial and senior economic official 
levels and the EU – ASEAN Secretariat conduct seminars on topics such as regional economic 
integration, liberalization of services, technical barriers to trade and trade facilitation.  
We have seen that both the EU and ASEAN are appreciating regional integration and are 
working hard to advance regional integration. We have also seen that the European Union is 
promoting and helping regional integration in South East Asia. However despite the fact that a 
lot of researchers have touched upon regional integration, especially on European integration, 
in depth studies on integration in particular in South East Asia are rare. With this research I 
want to look into the nature of the EU’s promotion of regional integration in South East Asia.  
When we look at the determinants of successful regional integration Mattli will argue that the 
demand and supply condition is fundamental for success. He argues that for a successful 
integration there needs to be a significant cross-border exchange, but if the gains for this 
exchange is too low e.g. due to the lack of complementarily among regional economies, the 
absence of vital economies of scale, this will hinder the integration process.  
Another important point according to Mattli is the need for a leader/country that will act as a 
central figure in the coordination of rules, regulations and policies, and will assist in order to 
avoid/consulate the tension that can arise from the inequitable distributions of gains from 
negotiations. Lastly, however this point is according to Mattli not as important as the first two, 
the creation of commitment institutions which will help to prompt the integration process by 
improving obedience with the rules and preventing carelessness (Mattli, 1999).  
However Douglas Webber has criticized the work of Mattli and argues that there has to be 
integration in other policies as well besides the economic integration in order to create a 
                                                     
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/ 
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successful integration; however he fails to explain how this point is related to the success of 
regional integration. The second critique point of Webber is that Mattli lacks to explain the 
difference of interregional variations of stated integrations goal i.e. why is the integration 
agenda of the EU more profound when compared to the integration agenda of NAFTA? 
Furthermore Webber argues that instead of one leader or one country that will act as a central 
figure it is more realistic that ‘a coalition of leading states’ will lead to successful regional 
integration. Another point Webber criticize is that commitment institutions are not per se 
preconditions of successful integration however these institutions can be the result of 
successful integration. Finally Webber argues that economic difficulties may not necessarily 
foster regional integration (Webber, 2001).  
Both Matti and Weber argue for a central figure, despite their difference in how, in order to 
create a successful integration. When we look at ASEAN we can clearly see the absence of a 
central figure. Indonesia, with the largest population and military, would suit the most for this 
role, even the concepts of musjawarak (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) which became 
the standard norms of conduct for ASEAN are originated from the traditional Indonesian village 
system (Guan, 200). However through the years the member states reacted doubtful to the 
intensions of Indonesia and tried to downplay her position (Leifer, 1989; Sudo, 1996). While 
Indonesia indeed has a strong military and a large population it also has a weak economy which 
as well played an important role in preventing the country to become a central figure in the 
region. Furthermore ASEAN has unique norms of procedure which makes it differ from other 
comparable institution (Lee, 2000). These norms says that ‘a leader is not allowed to act 
capriciously or forcefully and any suggestions given should take into consideration the views 
and feelings of fellow members; consensus will only be achieved when all members agreed to 
those suggestions’ (Guan, 2004).  
According to Mattli’s argumentation the absence of commitment institutions has a negative 
impact on the regional integration in Southeast Asia. As mentioned many times before the 
member states refuses to give up sovereignty or to let others interfere in their policy due to the 
harsh experiences of colonialism. These norms of sovereignty and non-interference are a 
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burden for commitment institutions, without changing these norms it is impossible for 
commitment and compliance among member states.  
To recall the arguments of Webber would mean that successful integration in Southeast Asia is 
impossible because the economic differences between the member states are too high. He 
argues that in order to create successful integration an economic and political homogenous 
region is a must. However when we look at the EU we cannot really speak of a fully 
homogenous region, so inequalities between member states can lead to difficulties in the 
integration process but it is not necessary a strong argument in explaining the success or failure 
of integration.  
This research will follow the on-going debate around the relevance of Manners’ concept of 
normative power. Analysing the foreign policy and external relations of the European Union 
through Normative Power Europe (NPE) has been accepted in both policy debates and 
academic studies. NPE creates a useful and significant concept that has provoked substantial 
debate and research among scholars (Diez, 2005: Pace, 2007: Bickerton, 2007: Tocci, 200: 
Whitman, 2009). The majority of the literature on NPE however is based on the conceptual 
level while the empirical level still lacks attention. Given the geographical and thematic ample 
of EU foreign policy there is solid scope and need for additional empirical analysis. With this 
research I want to research the intentional use of NPE at regional level, notably the action of 
the EU towards ASEAN.  
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NPE | Theoretical Framework 
Since introduced by Manners, NPE has emerged as one of the widely debated approaches in 
European studies. While critique persists, NPE continues to be innovatively applied by scholars 
exploring the role of the EU as a global actor. Whereas most approaches to EU-policy making 
are predominantly borrowed from frameworks aimed at understanding national level policy 
making, NPE is an EU specific framework (Birchfield: 2013).  
Normative Power Europe, with its roots in social constructivism, has the ideational impact of 
the EU’s international identity which is able to shape conceptions of normal according to 
Manners (2002: 239). According to Manners the EU offers a normative power because it 
changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from bounded 
expectations of state-centricity, which are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations 
system, to be universally applicable (2008: 45).  
Manners formulated a five-point conceptualization of normative power as being: ideational, 
involving principles, actions and impact, as well as having broader consequences in world 
politics (Manners: 2009). First of all, NPE makes use of normative justification rather than 
material incentives or physical force which makes it ideational rather than material or physical. 
Secondly, the conceptualization of normative power comprehends principles. Furthermore, if 
we want the normative justification to be persuasive it is necessary to take action in order to 
promote the principles. The fourth point shows us that if we want normative justification to be 
convincing it must bring impact. Finally normative power has broader consequences in the 
more holistic, justifiable and sustainable world politics.  
Manners makes a distinction in the main norms that the EU holds. According to him there are 
five core and four minor norms which are central to the EU’s normative dimension and are 
argued to be promoted in the rhetoric, discourse and action of the EU, internally and externally 
(Manners: 2002). The five fundamental norms of the EU he suggest are peace, liberty, 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Although described as minor norms social 
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solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance altogether with 
the five fundamental norms emphasizes the founding and legislative basis of the EU.  
The EU has gained the reputation of a normative power through various routes of transmission 
of the aforementioned norms (Manners: 2001). The first route according to Manners is the EU 
serving as an example of effective integration to third parties, the unintentional diffusion of EU 
norms to third actors, or in other words contagion. An example of contagion is the creation of 
the South American common market agreement. Through the informational route the EU’s 
public diplomacy strategy promotes norms as a result of strategic and explanatory statements. 
The third way of diffusing European norms is procedural: values and principles are encouraged 
on third parties through official relationships. Side note, the relationship aforementioned is 
extended from the EU to other actors whereas when a relationship of exchange exists between 
the EU and third parties such as through trade or aid agreements this is called transference. The 
fifth way to diffuse norms is called overt diffusion: the EU’s diplomatic involvement and physical 
presence in other states or international organizations influences the formulations of norms on 
third parties. Finally the EU is able to promote norms through cultural filter. An example of the 
cultural filter is the transmission of human rights norms in Turkey: the basic idea here is that 
the EU’s values can be advocated and promoted through either rejection or adaptation of the 
third party’s political and social contexts to those of Europeans.  
 
 What the EU is What the EU does Instruments 
NPE EU is based on a core 
set of norms and 
principles 
Set the norm through its 
existence and by acting 
according to those principles 
that it wants to promote 
- Transference 
- Procedural 
- Informational 
- Cultural Filter 
- Overt 
- Contagion 
 Table 1The European Union as a Normative Power; brief overview of the specificities of the concept used to assess the EU’s 
prompting of regional integration in Southeast Asia. 
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NPE | Research Question 
The research questions in this paper involve three parts. The first one defines the normative 
process of the European Union. Secondly, the normative impact of the EU will be analysed. The 
final part will assess the normative intent of the EU.  
 
1. Inclusiveness and reflexivity: Does the EU features an inclusive and reflexive foreign policy?  
 
Two criteria are particularly useful in distinguishing among the various arguments about the 
nature of EFP and the normative connotations read into EFP. According to Bicchi these two 
criteria are inclusiveness of the foreign policy making process and institutional reflexivity (2006: 
204). With inclusiveness is meant the extent to which EU foreign policy-makers permit a role in 
EFP making for external actors affected by EFP. With the second criterion institutional 
reflexivity is meant the capacity of EU foreign policy makers to critically analyse the EU’s policy 
and adapt it according to the effects the policy is expected to have on the targeted area (Bicchi, 
2006). Basically with inclusiveness Bicchi points on the involvement of non-members and with 
institutional reflexivity on the anticipation of effects on non-members and pre-emptively 
adapting to them.  
According to Bicchi normative power is relational (2006: 204). In order to be normative 
justifiable it must take the views of those outside the EU into account. If the EU really is a force 
for good it surely cannot exclude external input, criticism and reflection about the possible 
impacts of its action. The openness to learning can be seen as an indicator of the EU’s virtue 
and goodness. As for inclusiveness, Bicchi (2006: 289) emphasises that EU decision-makers 
should give a role to external actors, of affected third countries, during certain stages of the 
policy process.  
The second criterion, reflexivity, is about learning and changing behaviour when faced with 
better arguments, anticipating consequences of exporting an EU norm to non-members and 
(pre-emptively) adjusting EU policy to those consequences (Bicchi, 2006). The issue of 
reflexivity helps to distinguish between intentional behaviour, on the one hand, and routine-
based behaviour, on the other. In the definition by Giddens, institutional reflexivity refers to the 
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regularised use of knowledge about circumstances of social life as a constitutive element in its 
organisation and transformation (1991: 20). Reflexive behaviour thus springs from an ongoing 
reflection about the action, its context, its effects on such a context and the feedback of those 
expected effects on the action (Bicchi, 2006). According to Bicchi, for example, the norm of 
regionalism does not make sense everywhere and should therefore not be unreflectively 
exported. Reflexivity is thus expressed by the possibility of redemption through context specific 
knowledge and action based thereon. Routine-based behaviour is, on the contrary, founded on 
practices that have lost their original meaning to become ritualised and symbolic. For analysing 
EFP, reflexivity entails asking questions such as: To what extent is the action of the EU based on 
a conscious effort on the part of the EU foreign policy makers to critically analyse the expected 
consequences of norm promotion for all parties involved and adapt EFP accordingly (Bicchi, 
2006)? We can say that inclusiveness and reflexivity helps the EU in the export of norms 
because they engage partner countries and help to build a dialogue based on common 
understanding which should be conducive to the diffusion of norms.  
 
Accordingly my first hypothesis is as follows:  
H1: The more inclusive and reflexive the European Foreign Policy regarding ASEAN, the more 
likely that the European Union will pursue a common normative policy towards ASEAN.  
 
2. Development of norms in third countries: Does the EU have the ability to shape conceptions 
of what is normal?  
 
At this stage it is important to know whether some normative change has appeared in the 
norms that are promoted by the EU. One way to analyse the change in norms is to investigate 
the degree to which the norms projected by the EU are being referred to in the political and 
media discourse of the partner country and the extent to which they become part of the 
dominant discourse. However, that a norm became part of a discourse does not automatically 
mean that there is norm adoption. One possibility of tracking internalisation is to analyse the 
extent to which political actors make consistent use of a norm. If norms are ascribed the same 
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significance (and meaning) in different contexts and forums, then there is an increased 
probability that the relevant actors really mean what they say (cf. Risse 2000; Checkel 2001; 
Niemann 2004). This could be investigated, for instance, by analysing speeches of important 
third country politicians in different settings (Wekker & Niemann, 2009). 
Another important way to analyse the change in norms is analysing whether and to what extent 
the legislation of the partner country in question was amended in terms of the norms 
advocated by the EU. However, again, this does not automatically mean that there is norm 
change. It is possible that laws have been adjusted merely to fulfil a certain conditionality 
included by the EU. So, it is important to know whether the decision makers were involved 
accord with the implementation of that norm into domestic legislation. In order to do so, again, 
the consistency in words and deeds on the part of national decision makers on the significance 
of the norm would be informative (Wekker & Niemann, 2009).  
Another important factor is whether the change in the norms was in the first place solemnly 
and purely induced by the EU. It is possible that other third influential parties such as the UN, 
the US, the WTO or the political system of the partner country in question itself were the 
source of the change. If so, it is to be asked how similar their propagated norms are to those 
promoted by the EU and how close their relations with, or how direct their access to, the 
country in question has been. If there were different accentuations in the promotion of norms, 
then one can investigate whether norm implementation followed the line of the EU or rather 
that of another entity. Further clues may be provided by the political discourse in the partner 
country (Wekker & Niemann, 2009). Here, it is worth investigating, whether norms are 
mentioned in connection with the EU or rather in context with another party such as the UN. In 
addition, one should analyse the timing of norm change. Did norms change after the EU’s 
normative engagement in the country in question, or did it precede it? In the latter case the EU 
is unlikely to have been a significant source of that change (Wekker & Niemann, 2009).
 
 
 
Accordingly my second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: The more the European Union has the ability to change norms in ASEAN, the more likely 
that it will pursue a common normative policy towards ASEAN.  
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3. Self-image: How serious is EU normative commitment?  
 
The aim of this last hypothesis is to analyse whether the European Union really is a normative 
of power or rather wants to see itself as a normative power. If the EU claims to be a normative 
power it should also act in accordance with this. First of all we have to analyse whether the 
norms in question were part of the relation with ASEAN. Were the norms political integration 
and economic integration part of the agreements with ASEAN? Likewise, if these norms were 
not at the centre of the dialogue between the two regions, it should be questioned how 
genuine the EU is in her normative commitment (Wekker & Niemann, 2009). Secondly, it is 
important to analyse whether the projected norms hurt or serve EU interests (Goertz & Diehl, 
1992). If these norms are in conflict with self-interest, this will be a powerful indicator for the 
relevance of the norm because it has been invoked despite costs (Wekker & Niemann, 2009). 
Finally, we will have to look at the consistency of EU communications and the extent it uses 
double standards (Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006). Double standards, which cannot be justified, 
suggest that norms do not constitute the most important basis for making decisions (Wekker & 
Niemann, 2009). Consistency can be explored through for example I) analysing whether the EU 
applies the same standards that it asks of a certain third country internally and II) by analysing 
whether the EU apply the same standard for all the ASEAN members.  
 
Accordingly my second hypothesis is as follows:  
H3: The more serious the European Union is about normative commitment in ASEAN, the more 
likely that it will pursue a common normative policy towards ASEAN 
 
Hence my research question is as follows: 
Is the European Union adopting a normative power regarding the promotion of regional 
integration in Southeast Asia?    
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NPE | Case Selection 
There are various reasons to choose Southeast Asia as a case study. As mentioned in the 
introduction the EU has a lot of agreements and a lot of collaboration with countries all over 
the world. But the relation with Asia appears to confirm the one size fits all approach of the EU 
to export regional integration. The main contact point for the EU in Southeast Asia is ASEAN 
(the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) which is founded in 1967 with the main purpose of 
creating a stable environment, reduce the influence of external powers and satisfy their 
aspirations becoming a regional power (Indonesia) and constrain aspirations for regional 
dominance (Malaysia and Singapore). A main difference between ASEAN and the EU but also 
with Latin-American countries is that the ASEAN countries have renounced formal, 
supranational institutions, which would compromise their sovereignty (Solingen, 2005). 
Another reason which makes Southeast Asia more interesting is the fact that ASEAN is not a 
community of liberal democracies but includes Communist and authoritarian states, whose 
respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law has been often more than 
questionable. Especially when the countries Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia entered 
ASEAN, it affected the relation with EU. The EU started to loosen its relations with ASEAN by 
suspending meetings and avoiding high level contact (Camroux, 2008, p. 19-23). In 1994 the EU 
adopted a new Asian Strategy in which it sought to intensify the political dialogue with Asian 
countries but the issues human rights and democracy have been largely banned from the 
agenda of the Asia-Europe Meetings. However in 2001 in the Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnership with Asia the EU mentioned political rights such as ‘contribute to protection of 
human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law’. 
Although the ‘ASEAN-EU relationship is widely considered the model of interregional relations’ 
it has been less comprehensive and less institutionalized than in the case of Latin-America 
(Ruland, 2006). The EU carries an enormous trade deficit with ASEAN member states and this is 
why the member states are less willing to accept an interregional Free Trade Agreement than 
the EU. The trade among the ASEAN countries is still low and ASEAN knows that there has to be 
done more before it will establish the Economic Community (Camroux, 2008, p. 25-30). 
Furthermore in the past years the EU has focused on strengthening the integration among 
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ASEAN members. In the Strategic Framework of 2001 and the Strategy Document on Regional 
Programming for Asia 2007-2013 the EU declares the support for reinforce regional integration 
(political principles are first priority followed by environment policy, higher education and 
research and animal and human health).  
Regional integration on the other hand is a very broad concept. Considering the scoop of this 
thesis I will mainly focus on a few norms. First I will take political integration into consideration 
by looking at the democracy building norm. Secondly I will take economic integration into 
consideration by analyzing the role of the EU in realizing free trade agreements and the 
economic community in ASEAN.  
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NPE | Data Collection 
Within this research the focus lies on the analysis of written documents by the EU and ASEAN. 
In order to do so I will make use of process tracing. Process tracing centers on dissecting 
causation through causal mechanisms between the observed variables, primarily in case studies 
(George & Bennett, 2004). In essence, the focus of process tracing is on establishing the causal 
mechanism, by examining the fit of a theory to the intervening causal steps. By emphasizing the 
causal process the leads to certain outcomes, process tracing lends itself to validating 
theoretical predictions and hypotheses. Despite often focusing on only a single case, process 
tracing is a useful tool for testing theories. Researchers must examine a number of histories, 
archival documents, interview transcripts, and other similar sources pertaining to their specific 
case in order to determine whether a proposed theoretical hypothesis is evident in the 
sequence of a case. Looking at these sources in terms of the sequence and structure of events 
can serve as evidence that a given stimulus caused a certain response in a case. This method is 
particularly useful for looking at deviant cases and determining the specific factors that lead 
them to diverge from expected trends. While process tracing may not be able to exclude all but 
one theory in a given case, it can narrow the range of possible explanations and can disprove 
claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient to produce an outcome (George & 
Bennett, 2004).  
On side of the EU all documents will be retrieved via the archive on the website of the Council 
of the European Union. First of all the policy documents which are needed to analyze the policy 
process are selected. Also public statements in form of official press releases and Council 
conclusions expressed by the EU are selected. When we look at the policy documents I will 
focus on what measures have been adopted and why, while the strategy papers will help to 
explain the reasoning behind the EU policy. While the documents of ASEAN will be the primary 
sources, other documents which are available from other institutions such as the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), the Regional Forum of ASEAN (ARF) and South ASEAN Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 
will also be taken into consideration. The task here is to assess, arrange and organize the 
available primary data in order to present an overview of the procedure, construction and the 
impact of the normative power. The retrieved data will be divided firstly in to two sections 
Normative Power Europe in Southeast Asia: Deception or Reality? 
10/06/2014 
 
Leiden University | 20 
 
regarding regional integration namely political –and economic issues. Secondly the data will be 
leveled, obviously we can’t treat all EU documents as equal. A Green Paper saying something 
about for example cultural filter is not the same as a Council decision saying something about 
conditionality. It is in conjunction that the effects of these different documents would need to 
be considered. It is necessary to differentiate between different types of documents.  
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NPE | The Normative Process: Comprehending and Reflecting the ASEAN Way 
Informal relations between the EU (or if we want to be thoroughly correct, the European 
Community) and ASEAN were established in 1972 through the Special Coordinating Committee 
of ASEAN. This committee, the forerunner to subsequent institutionalized linkages with third 
countries, was reinforced by the establishment of the Joint Study Group in 1975, charged with 
the task of examining the substance and mechanism of cooperation between the two regional 
organisations (Pui Huem Lim, 1984). A fully-fledged international dialogue was formalized in 
1977 and the relationship was taken to a new level when the two regions’ regular contacts 
were raised to the ministerial level. The foreign ministers of both the EU and ASEAN have met 
for political dialogue every second year since the first ministerial meeting held in Brussels in 
November 19784. A cooperation agreement between the EEC and ASEAN was signed in March 
1980, at the second ministerial meeting5. Both parties agreed to develop commercial, economic 
and development cooperation. However, any reference to political cooperation, let alone 
cooperation on democracy building, was absent. The cooperation between the two regions was, 
especially during the early stages of the relationship, primarily core to economic and 
development issues.  
The early 1990s marked the beginning of a change in the EU’s policy towards ASEAN. During the 
Cold War the distant South had little direct impact on Europe’s security and political interests 
(Smith, 2002). With the end of the Cold War the attitude of the EU towards ASEAN, and other 
third countries in general, changed significantly. However, not only the end of the Cold War but 
also other important changes such as the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian rule in Indonesia 
(1998), the rise of a constitutional democracy in Thailand in the late 1980s, the reformasi6 
movement in Malaysia (1988) and most importantly the Asian financial crisis of 1997 have 
triggered the decision to change the attitude within and outside ASEAN. Liberal democratic 
norms such as democracy and human rights were now part of the policy towards ASEAN.  
                                                     
4
 ASEAN – EU Ministerial Meetings http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-eu-ministerial-meetings 
5
 EU – ASEAN Natural Partners http://eeas.europa.eu/asean/docs/eu_asean_natural_partners_en.pdf 
6
 The outbreak of the Reformasi Movement in September 1998 was caused by the sacking of former Deputy Prime 
Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. This incident tremendously shaped a major change in the political landscape in Malaysia. 
Supporters from all over went down to the streets to demonstrate and support the call for Reformasi. Massive and 
unprecedented demonstrations took place in Kuala Lumpur and other major cities (Saleh, 2013). 
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However, the transition to accepting and adapting liberal norms did not happen overnight and 
more important it did not happen easily. First of all the ASEAN members were not fond of the 
Western normative frame. Not only did ASEAN object a Western-style democracy, it also 
argued that the promotion of a Western-style democracy would undermine the foundations of 
regional order, the ASEAN Way, which were based on the inviolability of state sovereignty and 
the principle of non-intervention (Acharya, 2001). During the world conference on human rights 
in Vienna in 1993 the foreign minister of Singapore warned that universal recognition of the 
ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of 
diversity (Sen, 1997). The European Union decided to take a step back and the eleventh 
Ministerial Meeting between the two regions, that took place in Karlsruhe in 1994, was leaded 
by the code of conduct that was defined by the ASEAN Way7. However, the decision of the EU 
to return to more pragmatic policies and the down toning of value related issues were merely 
because of economic concerns. First of all the European economy was not in its best days. 
Secondly the rise of a trade bloc in Asia (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) made the 
Europeans even more concerned about their own economy. The European economy at the 
moment had priority over vaccinating the distant south with liberal norms.  
In 1996 the European Union imposed sanctions on Myanmar because the country was violating 
human rights and imprisoning members of opposition parties8. Measures included placing an 
embargo on the import and export of arms, freezing the funds of companies and individuals 
and banning investments in such industries as mining and forestry. Development cooperation 
with the government of Myanmar was also out of the question. In the meantime ASEAN was 
planning to accept Myanmar as their new member9. Also in this year the EU reiterated its 
commitment to strengthening ties with ASEAN. The European Commission published a 
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, concerning the renewal of the 
                                                     
7
 The 11
th
 EU – ASEAN Ministerial Meeting http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-94-195_en.htm 
8
 The EU relations with Myanmar / Burma 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dase20050419_003/dase20050419_003en.pdf 
9
 Preparations for the membership of Myanmar 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199612/msg00022.html 
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European Union - ASEAN relations10. The Communication explains that the EU - ASEAN 
cooperation is reoriented towards a more dynamic and concrete policy which has as its first 
objective the support of the approaching between the two societies and the two economies. In 
this Communication the EC addresses the importance of democracy: Inscribed in the European 
Union Treaty, the development and consolidation of democracy and the respect for human 
rights must be important elements of the political dialogue between the European Union and 
ASEAN. They will have to be taken into account when proposing new initiatives for the 
intensification of relations between the two groupings11.  
The EC proposes two options for launching a new dynamic in the current structures and 
agreement12. The first option highlights the inter-regional aspect of the cooperation. For 
launching, it will need a clear confirmation of a shared common will by the ASEAN countries 
that should bring into the formalisation of an inter-regional agreement13. Within the second 
option, to adopt a joint declaration EU - ASEAN defining the general aims and the establishment 
of an action plan14. This plan will ensure the dynamic implementation of the agreement and the 
launching of common activities in new areas. Besides the optional aspects, the importance of 
the reinforcements of EU - ASEAN relations is emphasized. The EC recommends  the 
encouragement of the political  dialogue  between the  two  regions  and the  cooperation  in  
the integration  effort made  by countries  in transition  into the  multilateral system. A 
common work to facilitate the exchanges and investments is also recommended. However, the 
second problem between the two regions took place when Myanmar became a member of 
ASEAN in 1997 (Guyot, 1998), while the European Union strongly opposed a membership (Tan, 
2013). This resulted in the abolition of the ministerial meetings for three years. Also the 
European Commission – ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee was abolished for more than two 
years. In 2000 the ministers decided to resume the meetings. The 13th Ministerial Meeting was 
                                                     
10
 Creating a New Dynamic on EU – ASEAN Relations http://aei.pitt.edu/6271/ 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 EU – ASEAN: Creating a New Dynamic http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-96-580_en.htm 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
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held in Vientiane15. However an important number of European ministers were absent during 
this meeting. The main reason for the absence of the ministers was the participation of 
Myanmar, although it was only allowed to send lower level representatives. The EU also 
decided to reject Myanmar to participate with the EC – ASEAN cooperation agreement because 
of the human rights violations at the hand of the junta in Myanmar.   
In 2001 the Commission felt the need for a new Communication: Europe and Asia: A Strategic 
Framework for Enhanced Partnership16. Central to this communication were human rights and 
democracy. The Commission argues that: In contributing to democratisation, good governance 
and the rule of law, and respect for human rights we should strengthen our bilateral and 
multilateral dialogue with our Asian partners, encourage civil society dialogue, and ensure that 
human rights and governance issues are mainstreamed in our cooperation activities17. 
Seizing the change in the attitude of the EU was inevitable during the 14th Ministerial Meeting, 
which took place in 2003 in Brussels. The EU was firmly backing the idea of regional integration 
in ASEAN and more important the EU seemed to be accepting the comprehensive way of 
approaching democracy by ASEAN18. The reason for this shift in European perspective was the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II also known as the Bali Concord II19. The leaders of ASEAN 
signed an accord to lay out a platform for the establishment of a European – style regional 
community that includes the creation of a single market by 2020. "We have just witnessed a 
watershed in the history of ASEAN" said Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was 
the chairman at the time being20. The Bali Concord II consists of three pillars: I) ASEAN 
Economic Community, II) ASEAN Security Community, III) ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community. 
                                                     
15
 The thirteenth ASEAN – EU Ministerial Meeting 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2000%20Vientiane%20Declaration%2013th%20ASEAN-
EU%20Ministerial%20Meeting-pdf.pdf 
16 Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced partnerships. Communication from the Commission 
http://aei.pitt.edu/38103/ 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 15
th
 ASEAN – EU Ministerial Meeting 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/74270.pdf 
19
 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II 
http://www.bic.moe.go.th/th/images/stories/ASEAN/declaration/ASEANconcordII.pdf 
20
 http://www.asean.org/news/item/speech-by-indonesian-president-megawati-on-the-presentation-of-a-farewell-
gift-to-malaysian-prime-minister-dr-mahathir-mohamad-at-the-asean-summit-in-bali-indonesia-7-october-2003 
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The Bali Concord II was followed by the Vientiane Action Programme 2004 – 2010 in order to 
provide and unify the strategies of the three pillars in an effective way. The VAP also includes a 
chapter in which enhancing peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region through 
comprehensive political and security cooperation is clarified21.  
In 2003 another Communication from the Commission regarding the distant South was 
published: A New Partnership with South-East Asia22. The Communication proposes that EU – 
South East Asia relations should be further developed in line with the guidelines contained in 
the 2001 Communication. The Communication identifies six strategic priorities, the human 
rights and democracy promotion agenda is one of the six key priorities in EU relations with 
South East Asia23.  
During the 16th Ministerial Meeting in 2007 between the two regions the ASEAN-EU dialogue 
relations reached a significant milestone with the adoption of the Nuremberg Declaration on an 
EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership in 200724. The Plan of Action to implement the Nuremberg 
Declaration on an ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership was drawn up and adopted during the first 
ASEAN-EU Summit in November 2007. Both documents provide a basis for enhancing 
cooperation between the EU and ASEAN in the political, security, economic, socio-cultural and 
development areas as well as in the fields of energy security and climate change/the 
environment. However both the documents lack the necessary clear guidance on the role of the 
EU regarding democracy promotion. What the document do is the promise to enhance political 
and security cooperation on five points which are as follows: I) enhancing dialogue between the 
EU and ASEAN, II) promoting ASEAN – EU cooperation in multilateral frameworks, III) 
cooperating to enhance global and regional security, IV) combating terrorism and other 
transnational crimes, V) cooperating in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction25. However, the only problem is not the lack of 
clear guidance, ASEAN also decided to draw attention on regional security issues within the 
                                                     
21
 VAP http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2004%20Vientiane%20Action%20Programme%202004-2010-pdf.pdf 
22
 Communication from the Commission: A new partnership with South East Asia 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_116277.pdf 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 16
th
 ASEAN – EU Ministerial Meeting 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/93216.pdf 
25
 Ibid.  
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framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum26. Although these two documents were products of 
collaboration between the two regions, ASEAN decided to not intercommunicate this issue 
within the framework of ASEAN – EU cooperation.  
The main struggle for the European Union, while promoting democratization in Southeast Asia, 
is the adhesion of the ASEAN members to the principle of non-interference. This ASEAN Way 
enables the EU to organize a formal legally binding policy with ASEAN members on the regional 
level on liberal norms such as democracy and human rights. The democratization progress is 
processing on a very low speed while the progress that has been made lacks the necessary 
clarity regarding the inclusion of the role of the EU.  
 
Unlike the slow and relatively delayed process on democracy building/political cooperation, 
economic cooperation between the two regions has a slightly longer and more vibrant history. 
While the cooperation on the political dimension at this stage looks more like a one-way 
process (with maybe a dead end), cooperation in the economic dimension is composed of a 
more active attitude by both of the regions. In 2012 ASEAN as a whole represented the EU’s 
third largest trading partner outside Europe, after the USA and China, with more than € 235 
billion of trade in goods and services27. Subsequently, in 2012 the EU represented ASEAN’s third 
largest trading partner after China and Japan, which is approximately thirteen percent of ASEAN 
trade. Between 2005 and 2012 European companies have invested an average of € 13.6 billion 
annually in the region, which makes the EU by far the largest investor in ASEAN28. Export from 
the EU to ASEAN mainly consists of chemical products, machinery and transport equipment 
while export from ASEAN to the EU mainly consists of also machinery and transport equipment 
as well as agriculture products, textiles and clothing29.  
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 Nurember Declaration on EU – ASEAN Enhanced Partnership  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-07-54_en.htm 
27
 ASEAN http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/ 
28
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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“What the world needs today is more economic integration, not less. That is why Europe and 
ASEAN need to come closer together, not farther apart. That is why regional integration within 
South East Asia offers so much potential.”30 
Karel de Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade 
In the first part of this chapter we have seen that although the formal relationship between 
ASEAN and the EU dates back to 1972, serious dialogue on political issues started only after the 
end of the Cold War. Official dialogues and cooperation’s on economic issues on the other hand 
already started in the year 1980 with the signing of the Co-Operation Agreement during the 
second Ministerial Meeting. This agreement still remains the legal basis of formal ASEAN – EU 
relations. With this agreement the two regions agreed to study ways and means of overcoming 
trade barriers, easing access to the markets of both regions, establishing new trade patterns by 
bringing together economic operators, recommending trade promotion measures and 
consulting each other on measures which could affect trade31. From this year on the most 
important platform for dialogue on economics and trade were, also, the Ministerial Meetings. 
However as we have seen in the previous part the 1990s was the stage for disagreements 
among the two regions. While the EU was busy signing agreements including hot issues such as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law with other third parties, discussing these issues 
with ASEAN was a hot issue itself. Even before ASEAN was able to reject the human rights 
clause, Portugal refused to give the EC the mandate to negotiate a new cooperation agreement 
with ASEAN in 1992 (Lim, 2002). The reason for this refusal by Portugal was the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timor. In 1994 the Commission releases a new Communication regarding a 
reviewed vision on Asia32. With this new Communication ‘Towards a new Asia strategy’ the 
Commission sets out the major strategic guidelines for a proactive EU policy concerning the 
countries of Asia (Southeast Asia, East Asia and South Asia) and proposes strengthening the 
                                                     
30
 EU-ASEAN: An efficient machine for the next 45 years 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-462_en.htm?locale=FR 
 
31
 Co-Operation Agreement between the EEC and ASEAN 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?redirect=true&treaty
Id=373 
32
 Towards a New Asia Strategy http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/r14201_en.htm 
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EU’s economic presence in Asia, contributing to the stability of the continent, promoting the 
economic development of the less prosperous countries and regions and contributing to the 
development of respect for human rights and the consolidation of democracy in Asia. Together 
with the Ministerial Meeting hold in 1994 in Karlsruhe the EU had shown that ASEAN would be 
the primary cornerstone of the EU’s engagement with Asian countries. As a result in 1996 the 
Asia Europe Meeting was created33. The Asia Europe Meeting is an interregional forum which 
consists of the countries of the European Union, the countries of ASEAN, China, Japan, South-
Korea, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Norway and 
Switzerland. The main aim of this platform is deepening the relation among the participating 
countries on political, economic, and socio-cultural issues. With this new platform, in July 1996, 
the Commission felt the need to release a new Communication, Creating a New Dynamic in EU 
– ASEAN Relations, which again emphasizes the argument that the relationship with ASEAN 
should be strengthened34. The following year was characterized by the dispute between 
Myanmar and the EU, the abolition of the next Ministerial Meeting and of course the Asian 
financial crisis.  
It is hard to let the ASEAN members bow down on binding regional norms, rules and 
procedures. Not only is this region too diverse in political, economic and socio-cultural 
dimensions, the presence of conflict among ASEAN members, which are mainly caused due to 
conflicting territorial claims, hinders the emergence of strong mutual trust as a decisive 
precondition for any type of regional community building (Wang, 2012). Acknowledging the 
high degree of diversity, ASEAN consciously rejected the legalistic approach to regional 
integration based on stringent regulatory frameworks that has characterised European 
integration. For several decades, it was customary for Southeast Asian politicians to state that 
ASEAN never tried or intended to emulate the EU (Wang, 2012). Instead, ASEAN developed an 
alternative approach to regional community building which we know today as the ASEAN Way 
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 ASEM http://eeas.europa.eu/asem/index_en.htm 
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 Creating a New Dynamic in EU – ASEAN Relations http://aei.pitt.edu/6271/1/6271.pdf 
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and commits itself on the pillars of informal, non-binding and consensus-oriented inter-
governmental cooperation.  
However, mainly because of the Asian financial crisis, in October 2003 the ASEAN members 
came to the conclusion that it was time for an economic community. The AEC is based on the 
ASEAN Vision 2020, which was published in 1997, and on the recommendations of the ASEAN 
High Level Task Force35. In 2007 the members adopted the AEC Blueprint which contains 
various measures and strategic schedules for implementation. In April 2009 the Declaration on 
the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009–2015) agreed to an accelerated timetable for 
the realization of the AEC36. The AEC has often been inappropriately compared to the EU Single 
Market. But the AEC is neither a customs union (with common external commercial policy) nor 
a full common market (with free mobility of capital and labour and some policy harmonization). 
In 2003, after ASEAN’s decision to create an economic community, the Commission publishes a 
new Communication: A New Partnership with South East Asia. In which it argues to enhance the 
economic and commercial links with Southeast Asia through37:  
 work to strengthen our bilateral economic relations, reducing non-tariff barriers to 
trade and facilitating investment, and helping build a pro-development policy climate 
 support cooperation between economic operators in our two regions; 
 strengthen our policy dialogue on economic and financial issues, and promote the use of 
the euro internationally; 
 continue to ensure favourable market access for the poorest developing countries 
 Recognise the role of transport and energy in our trade relations as well as the impact of 
both sectors on the environment. 
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 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf 
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 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009-2015) 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-cha-am-hua-hin-declaration-on-the-roadmap-for-an-asean-community-2009-2015-
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Furthermore, this Communication has led to the establishment of the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN 
Trade Initiative which provides a framework for dialogue and regulatory co-operation to 
enhance European trade with Southeast Asia38. The main aim of this framework is deepening 
the cooperation by, in the first stage, exchanging experience and further develops to more 
regulatory commitments between the two regions.  
Another main project that came to life is the ASEAN – EU Project on Regional Integration 
Support39. With this framework the European Union is assisting the ASEAN members for the 
goal of regional integration. Through exchanging its own experience the EU wants to improve 
ASEAN mechanisms and communications schemes and support capacity – building programmes 
for the ASEAN members and the ASEAN Secretariat. 
Although the collaboration on economic integration also mainly consists on dialogue, the 
decision to turn ASEAN into an economic community has changed the role of the EU. Not only 
are there simply talks about regional integration, the EU is by far the largest supporter of 
economic community building in Southeast Asia through financial and technical aid. Another 
important issue between the two regions to enhance economic integration is the decision to 
establish an EU – ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. The first idea for an FTA between the two 
regions came during the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the European Union Trade 
Commissioner Consultation which was held in Jakarta, 2004. However according to the 
Philippine Trade Secretary, Cesar Purisima, the EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, made it 
during this consultation clear that the EU preferred multilateral arrangements under the WTO 
and that the EU was only pursuing FTA negotiations that had been started before 199940.  
In contradiction to the opinion of the Philippine Trade Secretary, with the green light from the 
Council, the Commission started the FTA negotiations at the EU – ASEAN Economic Ministers 
Consultations in Brunei, 2007. Together with the ASEAN Economic Community, the EU – ASEAN 
FTA are the most important achievements in which the EU actively and visibly plays a role in.  
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NPE | The Normative Impact: EU, The Last Norm bender?  
ASEAN members often state that they are willing to work together, yet it is their own 
government that forms an obstacle. We have already addressed the diversity among ASEAN 
members and the hardship that comes together with this diversity. While there are a few 
countries that operate under a democratic system, half of the ASEAN members are 
constitutional monarchies or communist regimes. This fact makes it harder to even address 
liberal norms such as democracy and human rights. However, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the turning point for a more active policy within and outside ASEAN was the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. Add to this the rapid economic rise of China and India and it was almost 
inevitable for the ASEAN members to change their regional cooperation in managing political – 
security challenges. The Bali Concord II is the most eye-catching accomplishment regarding 
incorporating liberal norms, such as democracy and human rights, in Southeast Asian’s 
regionalism41. In principle, the Bali Concord II is a promise by the leaders of the ASEAN member 
states to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that 
countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment42. In accordance with the Bali Concord II the members 
agreed with the draft of an ASEAN Charter in 2005. The final ratification of the ASEAN Charter 
took place on 15 December 2008.  
However in the meantime, as a democratic country Indonesia was the first among the ASEAN 
members that took the remarkable step. In June 2003 during the ASEAN Senior Officials’ 
Meeting, Indonesia argued that it was time to turn ASEAN into a security community43. With 
this proposition, although it was not mentioned instantly, Indonesia was aiming to put 
democracy promotion on the ASEAN agenda. On domestic level Indonesia itself was enhancing 
their democratic norms. After the end of the Cold War, not only the European Union but also 
other Western countries started to demonstrate their disagreement with the communist 
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ideology which was present in Indonesia. Not only was Indonesia, at the time, struggling on the 
economic level due to the financial crisis, it was also struggling on the political level due to the 
consequences of the authoritarian government of Suharto. Because of the murder of East 
Timorese civilians in 1991, the Congress of the USA decided in 1992 to limit the International 
Military Training and Education with Indonesia44. In 1993 the USA helped to pass a resolution in 
the UN Human Rights Commission which expresses deep concern over Indonesian human rights 
violations in East Timor45. The financial crisis of 1997 was perceived the hardest by Indonesia. 
Because of the flight of foreign capital Indonesian companies with US dollar-denominated 
borrowings struggled to service their debts and many went bankrupt. Bank Indonesia tried to 
save the situation by selling US Dollars, which only resulted in the drainage of the Indonesian 
foreign exchange reserves. For the first time in history, Suharto did not attend the ASEAN 
presidents’ summit which was held in December 1997. This caused to speculations about his 
future presidency. The enormous weight of the financial crisis plus the enormous 
demonstrations against his government made Suharto resign in 1998. This was the beginning 
for a new democratic Indonesia.  
By proposing this change in ASEAN, Indonesia was aiming to also increase the political 
accountability in the other ASEAN countries. The main new points that needed to be applied, 
according to Indonesia, were as follows (Yuzawa, 2013):  
 Promote people’s participation (particularly through the conduct of general elections) 
 Implement good governance 
 Strengthen judicial institutions and legal reforms 
 Promote human rights and obligations through the establishment of the ASEAN 
Commission on Human Rights 
As you will guess this remarkable step of Indonesia was not welcomed with open arms by the 
other ASEAN members. There was clearly a paradox according to the members: promoting 
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democracy while insisting on one of the core foundations of the ASEAN Way, non-interference. 
As a result of this paradox Indonesia had to take her step back. However, this rejection by the 
members did not hold back Indonesia. A year later at the tenth ASEAN Summit and we could, 
again, see Indonesia trying to put democracy back on the ASEAN agenda46. This persistent 
behaviour of Indonesia resulted in the implementation of political development in both the 
ASEAN Security Community as well as the Vientiane Action Programme. However, this 
implementation did not consist of the initial proposal of Indonesia. Both the documents only 
contain a simplified version of the Indonesian proposal. The ASEAN leaders mandated the 
Eminent Persons Group to provide bold and visionary ideas for the ASEAN Charter. As a result 
the EPG came up with a pro-democratic and people-centred charter47. However, the EPG failed 
to pay attention to the people’s desire and consequently the ASEAN Charter failed to adopt the 
ideas of the EPG (Chongkittavorn, 2007). Positive examples by the ASEAN Security Community 
are the inclusion of democracy and the urge that it is necessary in order to achieve peace, 
stability, democracy and prosperity in the region. Furthermore it contains that ASEAN member 
countries shall not condone unconstitutional and undemocratic changed of government. Finally 
the Security Committee also addresses the promotion of human rights within ASEAN. In the 
VAP it is stated that the ASEAN Security Committee can be realized through a democratic, 
tolerant, participatory and transparent community in Southeast Asia. However, for example the 
first preposition of Indonesia, the call for promoting people’s participation particularly through 
elections, is not available in both of the documents. As a result the finished ASEAN Charter 
leaves much space for flexible interpretation rather than rigid guidelines.  
Another interesting localization of the democracy norm can be found regarding the first 
elections after decades in Myanmar in 2010. The first general elections after decades in the 
military ruled Myanmar came with the necessary doubts. The elections laws in the country 
provided question marks about the credibility of the upcoming elections: would these laws 
enable the elections to be free, fair and inclusive? Although ASEAN withheld comment on 
Myanmar’s election there were also some member countries who openly offered help 
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regarding the elections. For example the Philippines foreign affairs secretary Romula called on 
the military junta to ensure that the elections would be free, fair, credible and all – inclusive48. 
Similar voices also came from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. They have argued that the key 
to winning international credibility can be found by releasing the opposition leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi. The Thai foreign minister Piromya even offered to help the government with holding a 
free, fair and inclusive election: “Without being seen as interfering in Myanmar’s domestic 
issues, as friends and members of the ASEAN family we would like to see national reconciliation 
and peace in Myanmar. Holding free and fair elections will allow the country to bring peace and 
reconciliation back”49. As a result Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader of the National 
League Party for Democracy, has won the elections in 2010. Although Myanmar has a long way 
to go, it is gaining international credibility bit by bit. In 2013 the EU decided to lift all sanctions 
on, except for an arms embargo. British foreign secretary Hague said that the progress made was 
sufficient to justify lifting the sanctions: "It is absolutely vital to continue work; to try to stop this 
ethnic violence and the European Union countries have a role to play in that, including in the 
training of police forces, where we can help, in promoting dialogue between faiths"
50
. 
A more recent incident in Southeast Asia regarding democracy is the coup d’état that took place 
a few weeks ago in Thailand. Just like the coup d’état back in 2006, ASEAN decided to remain 
still regarding this second attack on democracy in less than 10 years. While in 2006 five member 
states (Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore) decided to let their opinion known, in 2014 
only the Philippines and Singapore decided to express their grave concern and support for a 
peaceful resolution on the present situation. Promoting democracy, building on democracy is not 
a genuine collective goal among the ASEAN members. It resulted from a political process of 
bargaining and compromise driven mostly by obligation and the need to accommodate the 
demand of a fellow member of ASEAN (Sukma, 2009).  
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The Communication Global Europe: Competing in the World from 2006 sets out that trade 
policy can contribute to creating growth and jobs in Europe51. The communication argues that 
European openness to others and their openness to Europe are critical and mutually reinforcing 
factors in European competitiveness. With this new Communication the Commission argues 
that it is time for a new generation of competitiveness-driven bilateral free trade agreements 
with key partners, in which economic criteria is a primary consideration52. In the Communication 
the Commission also points out to the emerging economies, particularly, in Asia. As a result in 
2007 the EU launched its New Partnership for the 21st  Century with Asia. With this partnership 
the EU is aiming to negotiate free trade agreements with India, South-Korea and ASEAN.  
According to the theory of economist Bela Balassa there are five stages of economic integration: 
I) free trade areas in which custom tariffs on inner borders are absent, II) common market in 
which there is free flows of goods, III) monetary union in which there is a common currency and 
unified policies, and IV) economic union which there is full harmonization of economic policies 
(Balassa, 1961). The agreement to establish a free trade agreement among the ASEAN 
members only took place after the end of the Cold War, in 1992. The end of the Cold War 
together with growing power of the neighboring countries such as China and India made the 
ASEAN members consider new ways to amplify/toughen their own presence. The ASEAN 
members agreed to mainly work on eliminating import quotas and significantly reducing import 
tariffs among the members. At the time ASEAN consisted of six members (Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), the other four countries (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam) that joined ASEAN later on were obligated to sign the AFTA agreement 
in order to join ASEAN. However these latecomers were allowed to meet the obligations on a 
longer timeframe. The finalized ASEAN Free Trade Agreement took place in 2003. However, 
ASEAN continued to expand its Free Trade Agreements in their near neighborhood. In 2010 
Free Trade Agreements with China, India and South – Korea were completed. With Japan, the 
ASEAN members agreed to strengthen their relation with a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership rather than a Free Trade Agreement. Although this agreement consists mainly of 
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liberalizing and facilitating trade and goods, and promoting cooperation between Japan and 
ASEAN, it also contains the element of a possible Free Trade Agreement. Since 2012 ASEAN is 
also engaged in talks to establish a Comprehensive Economic Partnership with the 
aforementioned FTA partners and the FTA partners in the Pacific: Australia and New Zealand. It 
seems that ASEAN is in full speed trying to continue their efforts in external integration.  
The first official talk about a FTA between ASEAN and the EU took place at the ASEAN – EU 
Economic Ministers Consultations in 2007. However, during the ASEAN Summit in November 
2007 both parties concerned a Joint Statement: the progress for a regional FTA was not going 
evenly. Because of the slow progress four exchange of view meetings were organized in 2008. 
However, the slow progress on ministerial level was not the only problem. According to some 
Asian countries the design of the FTA was more in favor of the European market. That is to say, 
the FTA would open up the Asian market allowing free entry to agricultural products from 
Europe while the EU maintains all kinds of direct and indirect subsidies, technical and sanitary 
barriers to the entry of ASEAN products into the European market. Especially in the less 
developed ASEAN countries resistance voices against this FTA became more obvious. This led to 
the formation of an EU – ASEAN FTA Campaign Network, which was formed in order to 
promote the FTA on a regional level. A counter attack to this formation was organized by 
networks of social movements and NGOs in Southeast Asian countries. Especially in the 
countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam active movements to stop 
the FTA negotiation were available. After seven negotiations rounds, in March 2009, both sided 
agreed to take a pause in the negotiation in order to reflect on the appropriate format of future 
negotiations53. “We started the negotiations with ASEAN as a bloc, but we had to stop this for 
two main reasons. There is a very different level of development in each of the countries, which 
has made negotiations very difficult. Secondly, because of Myanmar.” says Karel de Gucht54, 
European Commissioner for Trade. Not long after this decision, the Commission presented a 
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report on the EU – ASEAN negotiations, in which the EU underlined its intention to stay 
engaged with the region55. For example, The EU and Singapore have initialed the text of a 
comprehensive free trade agreement on 20 September 2013. The draft agreement needs now 
to be agreed upon by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, before being 
ratified by the European Parliament56. According to the EU these bilateral FTA’s could 
constitute building blocks that the EU and the ASEAN may wish to consolidate in due course 
into a region-to-region agreement.  
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NPE | The Normative Intent: Family Matter? 
 
Democracy cannot be considered as an all-or-nothing affair. It is a question of the degree to 
which citizens exercise control over political decision-making and are treated as equals. These 
values of democracy are realized through political institutions and practices. A country’s political 
institutions and practices are often shaped by its history, culture and economic factors. 
Democratization is not a linear process that moves from an authoritarian to a democratic 
regime. It is a multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary process that moves back and forth, where some 
institutions are more developed than others (European Commission 2008: Annex B).  
According to the EU, democracy and human right are universal values that should be vigorously 
promoted around the world57.They are integral to effective work on poverty alleviation and 
conflict prevention and resolution, in addition to being valuable bulwarks against terrorism. An 
example of European foreign policy which promotes liberal norms such as democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law is the Cotonou agreement which formally gives civil societies an 
enhanced role in capacity building (Börzel &Risse, 2004). In 2006 the EU launched the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, which grant aid where no established 
development cooperation exists, and can, intervene without the agreement of the 
governments of third countries. However the question here is how serious is the EU? Is the EU 
trying to build on its own image by only claiming that it is a normative power or is it genuinely 
is/trying to be a normative power?  
First of all, it is to be asked whether democracy promotion was at the centre of the relationship 
among the two members. As we have seen in the previous chapters for a long time democracy 
or any other liberal political norm was not part of the collaboration between the two regions. 
Only after the end of the Cold War and especially after signing the Maastricht Treaty, the 
European Union saw democracy promotion as an undeniable important part of its internal and 
external policies. Although the EU is on familiar terms with the ASEAN Way and their 
determination to stick on the non – interference rule, democracy building has always been an 
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important part of the Commission’s Communication reports. However, the EU did not only 
address democracy building in their Communication’s also during the Ministerial Meetings with 
ASEAN the importance of democracy was underlined. This attitude of the EU was not welcomed 
with open arms by ASEAN members; it even led to much annoyance among the members. 
However, the EU still managed to include terms like democracy and human rights in 
agreements, such as the Nuremberg Agreement and the Bandar Seri Begawan Agreement. Even 
though these agreements lack the necessary clear guidance for democracy building, what is 
important here is the fact that the EU takes democracy building as a core norm and tries to 
implement it in official documents and dialogues.  
Secondly, we should ask if the European engagement in Southeast Asian democracy building is 
caused out of self – interest. Self-interest can largely be divided into three categories: historical, 
commercial and security interests (Del Biondo, 2012). Historical interests relate to the desire of 
EU member states to maintain a sphere of influence in the distant South. This can be linked to 
colonial ties or to historical links on language-based grounds. This historical interest was 
especially visible when in 1991 the Indonesian army caused a bloodbath amongst protesting 
civilians in Dili. The European reaction was initially bilateral in nature: the Netherlands 
threatened to cancel development aid to Indonesia. Following this, Indonesia completely cut off 
its cooperation in development assistance with the Netherlands (Van den Ham, 1993: Loewen 
2008). The second historical interest happened between Indonesia and Portugal. This time the 
Portuguese tried to intensify the interregional pressure on Indonesia through the EU (Dreis-
Lampen, 1998). However ASEAN did not even bother itself to comment on the East-Timor 
question, due to their non-interference principle, the ASEAN Way. Important at this stage is to 
ask whether the EU gave priority over liberal norms such as democracy or human rights over for 
example trade interests. Apart from these two incidents the EU was actively criticizing the 
situation in Myanmar, however in this case there were no clashing interests.  
Thirdly it is important to know whether the European Union is consistent in its democracy 
promotion/building policy. According to Bicchi (2006) the EU is consistent because the 
instruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance look surprisingly similar across the globe. According to Börzel and Risse the use of 
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political conditionality, political dialogue and capacity building mechanisms in all world regions 
demonstrate movement towards a coherent approach (2004). However when we look at the 
agreement that the EU has made with countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand we 
will see that these essential components are not taken into consideration. While we can explain 
the absence of these essential components by referring to the fact that these countries are all 
democracies, we have to recall that the EU also has agreements with for example China, which 
we certainly cannot call a democracy. Likewise the agreements with ASEAN also lack clear 
components of democracy and human right. According to Smith (2004) poor marginal states of 
little importance to the EU or one of its member states’ tend to be subjected to negative 
conditionality; these are the cases where it is easiest to show that you are doing something 
about human right. Smith argues that the EU acts in accordance with its own personal benefits. 
If any negative conditionality would harm commercial interests, because the country is 
strategically or politically too important or because they have doubts about the effectiveness of 
negative measures the EU would freeze this conditionality (Smith, 2001). So if the democracy 
promotion does not harm European geopolitical, economic or security interest the EU will 
pursuit democracy promotion otherwise not. Negative conditionality has played a major role in 
the relation between the EU and Myanmar; it is even addressed as one of the reasons why the 
EU – ASEAN FTA has been paused. However, Thailand, which has been known as one of the 
most democratic countries in Southeast Asia, is year after year the stage of political conflict 
which has resulted in a coup in 2006 and most recently in May 2014. Yet, the EU did not pursue 
any negative conditionality on Thailand nor did it mention Thailand as an obstacle in the EU – 
ASEAN relation. There are clearly double standards in EU policy regarding democracy 
promotion/building which cannot be justified.    
"The EU and ASEAN are the two most ambitious regional integration projects in the world. 
That makes ASEAN and EU not just natural allies but actually members of the same family 
who can learn and mutually benefit from each other. As ASEAN's largest source of foreign 
investment and major trading partner, the EU and ASEAN have and always will invest first 
and foremost in our economic and people-to-people alliance. This is what makes a real 
positive difference to our citizens' lives through job creation, education, tourism and other 
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areas. Our ASEAN and EU family matters… and, as the EU Ambassador, I am proud of that."58  
– EU Ambassador Julian Wilson.  
In accordance with Wilson, at a conference organised by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the EU-Asia Centre on 15 October 2013 the Belgian Foreign Minister Didier 
Reynders agreed and stressed that the EU and ASEAN were natural partners that share the 
same DNA. During this conference he emphasized that the EU wants to see a strong, united 
and self-confident ASEAN which we can address in a block-to-block dialogue. The EU and 
ASEAN share a commitment to regional integration as a means of fostering regional 
stability, building prosperity and addressing global challenges. The EU fully supports 
ASEAN’s renewed efforts to build a closer relationship amongst its member states. The EU 
wants a strong, united and self-confident ASEAN, proceeding with its own integration59. But 
how sincere is the European Union?  
First of all, it is to be asked whether economic integration, and by this I solemnly mean an 
economic community and free trade agreements, was at the centre of the relationship 
among the two members. Although economic relations between the two regions have a 
longer history compared to political relations, the dialogue about economic integration is 
relatively new. Serious talks about economic integration started after the agreement for an 
ASEAN Charter in 2005. An example of improved relation is the Vision Group on ASEAN – 
EU Economic Partnership was established by the ASEAN economic ministers and the EU 
trade commissioner in 2005. The main aim of the Vision Group was to look into the 
feasibility of a possible ASEAN-EU FTA, economic integration and other new initiatives for 
enhancing economic cooperation and ties between ASEAN and the EU60. Economic 
integration became an even more important issue among the two regions when the EU 
established the ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU and the ASEAN – EU 
Programme for Regional Integration Support Phase. Talks about a Free Trade Agreement 
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were core to the relations in the period 2007 – 2009. Since then a possible ASEAN – EU has 
been placed on the shelves.  
Secondly, we should ask if the European engagement in Southeast Asian economic 
integration is caused out of self – interest. As we know ASEAN is an important trade 
partner for the EU. A quantitative report commissioned by the European Commission in 
2006 argued that an ASEAN-EU FTA would boost EU exports to ASEAN by 24.2%, while the 
latter would benefit from an increase of 18.5% of its exports to the European Union. It went 
on to conclude that an EU-ASEAN FTA would contribute to more than a 2% gain in the 
ASEAN GDP, although the increase for the four least developed ASEAN countries would be 
more modest (Camroux, 2008). Obviously this would be beneficial for the EU. However, 
although the EU was the initiator of this agreement it also mutually agreed with ASEAN to 
stop the negotiations on this subject.  
Finally, it is important to know whether the European Union is consistent in its economic 
integration policy. While the EU was the initiator of the FTA, reluctance from the ASEAN 
side to negotiate ceased the negotiations. ASEAN was not the initiator and the agreement 
was not, at least not as much, in favour with the Southeast Asian interests. According to the 
EU, though, the negotiations were ceased because of the diversity among the ASEAN 
member and because of the situation in Myanmar. However, since last year the EU lifted a 
great part of the sanctions against Myanmar and recognized the positive developments. 
This would mean that the FTA agreement with ASEAN could be resumed. However, the EU 
at this stage does not mention any intention of renewed negotiations of an EU – ASEAN FTA. 
Instead the EU is actively negotiating FTA’s with individual ASEAN members such as 
Singapore and states that it will negotiate with any country that will ask the EU to negotiate.  
 
  
Normative Power Europe in Southeast Asia: Deception or Reality? 
10/06/2014 
 
Leiden University | 43 
 
NPE | Conclusion 
Taking ASEAN as an example of European promotion of regional integration, this thesis has 
discussed first of all the inclusiveness and reflexivity of democracy promotion in EU policy 
regarding ASEAN.  It was obviously not the easiest task for the EU to include ASEAN in their 
talks about democracy promotion. However, the analysis of EU – ASEAN dialogues provides 
some support for Europe’s normative power in international relations. Although the persistence 
of ASEAN Members to do everything on their own, ASEAN, way; the EU managed to issue 
norms as democracy and human rights in their dialogues. We cannot say that democracy is the 
main dialogue subject between the two regions, however compared to the early stage of their 
relationship ASEAN has matured and is able to talk about these liberal norms because of 
European obstinacy. Since the signing of the ASEAN Charter, economic integration has become 
a more important issue in the dialogue between the regions. While the Co-Operation 
agreement did mention, although not specifically, economic integration as a focal point in their 
relation, the bulk of the dialogues among the two regions were rather more focused on trade 
issues. The Communications by the Commissions on both democracy promotion as economic 
integration were rather uncritical and vague in their analysis.   
Since the signing of the Bali Concord II and the Nuremberg Declaration, norms concerning 
democracy and human rights have, slightly, begun to change in ASEAN. Also among the ASEAN 
Members opinions about democracy building became louder. The fact that ASEAN member 
states also has begun to talk openly about democracy means that democracy promotion is no 
longer only a European priority. This will ease the dialogue between the two regions on this 
sensitive issue. However, although it is now easier to talk about democracy and although 
democracy building and human rights are implemented in agreements between the EU – 
ASEAN as well as in ASEAN there are some fundamental problems. The main problem here is 
the necessary precision of democracy in the agreements in order to implement them. As long 
as the emphasis is on ASEAN principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention it will be hard 
to adjust these norms in national legislation. However, the level of progress should not be 
viewed too sceptically, since norm changes do take time. On the economic level however the 
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regions failed to establish a free trade agreement. Clearly, the EU’s will to negotiate a deep and 
comprehensive FTA clashed with ASEAN members’ economic disparity and political interests 
(Camroux, 2008).  Although the promotion of its deeply institutionalized and liberalized single 
market through a FTA failed, at least for the time being, the EU is still promoting this model 
through helping ASEAN with establishing their economic community. Although, we have to wait 
until 2015 to see whether the implementation of the economic community in ASEAN will bring 
any change.   
Finally as for the seriousness and genuineness of EU normative commitment, the democracy 
norm does seem to have a central role in the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. However, 
according to my analysis there are some double standards. The most visible double standard is 
the different attitude of the EU against ASEAN members. While Thailand repeatedly violates 
democratic values, any negative conditionality on Thailand is absent. Myanmar, on the other 
hand is “victim” of European embargos. Furthermore the EU emphasizes on the importance of 
an FTA with ASEAN but fails to establish one and goes further with individual negotiations. 
More important in this case is however the fact that Myanmar was a reason for the EU to stop 
the negotiations. We should expect that now the EU has lifted the sanctions against Myanmar 
and recognized the positive changes in the country, it should take the lead and resume the 
ASEAN – EU FTA negotiations.  
So how can EU action vis-à-vis ASEAN be characterized? The questionable normative intent of 
the EU combined with the relatively weak localization of norms leads to a feeble credibility and 
legitimacy of EU normative power. Combine this with the relatively weak inclusiveness and we 
can argue that Manners was overly enthusiastic about the EU’s role as a normative power.  
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